Abstract: The US-EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement provides guidance on processing and transferring EU citizens' airline passenger data to the US Department of Homeland Security for counterterrorism and security purposes.
INTRODUCTION
After more than a decade of cumbersome negotiation, three versions and one annulment, the current US-EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement, from 2011, still does not satisfy EU data protection concerns. The agreement establishes a set of guidelines on processing and transferring EU citizens' airline passenger data to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), largely for counterterrorism purposes.
1 Conceptual approaches to security, counterterrorism, privacy and data protection on both sides of the Atlantic are divergent, but fluid. As such, the parties have found it difficult to conclude an agreement that satisfies all their concerns. The current PNR agreement from 2011 is undergoing review.
Data protection is a fundamental right in the EU, and in view of the May 2014 Digital Rights
Ireland judgement and the November 2014 referral of the Canada-EU PNR agreement to the CJEU, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the current US-EU PNR agreement does not live up to EU * PhD candidate at Utrecht University and Senior Research Associate at Public International Law and Policy Group. Thank-you to Professor Cedric Ryngaert and Professor John Vervaele for comments on an earlier draft. The research that resulted in this publication was funded by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research under the VIDI Scheme. This publication also forms part of the RENFORCE/CLEER project on The External Effects of European Union Law. All websites accessed 16 November 2015. 2 This leads to the questions of how precisely the agreement fails to uphold EU data protection principles; how these failures could be rectified; and how this rectification would imply a degree of extraterritoriality.
To better safeguard the fundamental right to data protection for EU citizens, in negotiations with the US, EU authorities should push for the PNR agreement to incorporate more EU data protection standards. If incorporated into the agreement, this could be seen as a necessary form of legal diffusion beyond its borders as the DHS processes EU citizens' data on US soil. Indeed, in light of recent legal developments, EU data protection principles could necessarily extend beyond EU territory in the PNR context. The following briefly outlines the evolution of the US-EU PNR agreements and then examines how the agreements adhere to data protection principles espoused in the Data Protection Directive (DPD) and the recent Digital Rights Ireland judgement, highlighting how the agreement could and should better protect EU citizens' fundamental right to data protection. This scope for improvement lends itself to a soft form of the extraterritorial application of EU law.
THE US-EU PNR AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND VALUE-BASED TENSIONS
The DHS began collecting passenger information in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US.
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The US-EU PNR agreement aims to counteract terrorism and serious transnational crime. Any passenger flying between the EU and US must have his or her personal data recorded and stored for security purposes. In general, a controller, that is, an airline carrier, located in an EU Member State collects PNR data. As such, the relevant State's national laws, pursuant to the EU's DPD, apply to the data processing.
6 According to the DPD, when transferring personal data to third States where the data will be processed, the third State must ensure an adequate level of data protection. 7 The EU does not consider the US to satisfy the adequacy requirements of the Directive, rendering any PNR data transfers to the US unlawful under the Directive per se. In contrast, US law obliges airlines to transfer PNR data to the US. As such, this conflict of laws warranted bilateral negotiations, the evolution of which is explored below.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PNR AGREEMENTS
The US-EU negotiations and the evolution of the 2004, 2007 and 2011 PNR agreements show how the two parties have tried, successfully and unsuccessfully, to apply their value-based laws to EU citizens' personal data. Despite the EU's continual attempts to ensure an EU level of data protection when that data is transferred to the US, the US has resisted these attempts at such diffusion of EU law beyond its borders.
The de jure situation, however, reads differently. The 2011 PNR agreement refers to values supposedly common to the US and EU. For instance, the agreement affirms both parties desire "to prevent and combat terrorism and serious transnational crime effectively [to protect their] common values", "while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms and recognising the importance of privacy and the protection of personal data and information ".9 Indeed, these references suggest the two parties agree on how much weight ought to be accorded to the values of security and data protection, and then translated into legislation.
The reality, however, as gleaned from the myriad negotiations, joint reviews, and US and EU political and civil society reactions, shows a long-lived struggle between the parties to protect their own competing interests and implied jurisdictional claims. It is difficult to say whether the current PNR agreement reflects an extension of the "long arm" of EU data protection law or a regurgitation of US demands.
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( In May 2006, the CJEU annulled the Council Decision on the conclusion of the US-EU PNR agreement, ruling that it was concluded ultra vires; it did not make pronouncements on whether the agreement violated the rights to privacy and/or data protection. The following focuses closely on the Digital Rights Ireland decision as it is more directly connected with the PNR agreement. It is, however, necessary to mention the CJEU's 6 October 2015 ruling in the Schrems case, which concerned the transfer of EU citizens' to the US under the bilateral Safe Harbour agreement and associated concerns of mass surveillance by US authorities, and which will undoubtedly influence future PNR agreement dialogues. 23 In that case, the Court declared the Safe Harbour agreement invalid for several reasons. The main reason was that the agreement did not prevent US authorities from interfering with EU citizens' fundamental right to data protection, especially as US security and law enforcement requirements overrule protections in the Safe Harbour agreement. 24 The European Parliament has since urged the Commission to assess the decision's impact on, inter alia, the PNR agreement. European Parliament, LIBE Committee press release, 'MEPs debate plans to use EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to fight terrorism', 11 November 2014 text available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bIM-PRESS%2b20141110IPR78121%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN. 21 Newman, supra n. 5, at 485 cit. J. Klosek, The War on Privacy (Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007). 22 See DPD, supra n. 6, Art. 6. The Parliament also highlighted the importance of the proportionality and necessity principles, which most commentators complained the US-EU PNR agreement violated. 27 Below some more specific principles are outlined.
(1) Purpose Limitation
The DPD provides that personal data must be collected for "specified, explicit and legitimate purposes" and the data must be "adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed". 28 The uses for personal data as articulated by the On purpose limitation, "As a consequence, the mentioned purposes are not specifically linked to the overarching goal of the prevention, detection and investigation and prosecution of terrorist and related crime, which were subject to the former agreements. PNR data can be thus used for other purposes not related to terrorist or serious crimes (i.e. border control, use if ordered by a court, other violations of law)" -Hornung and Boehm, supra n. 8, at 7. interference with those rights. 43 The PNR agreement also fails to set out specific rules limiting the interference with the right to data protection.
The CJEU pronounced that, by adopting the Directive, the EU legislature failed to act in accordance with the proportionality principle. 44 The Court thus declared the Directive invalid. 45 In light of this, it can be asked whether the US-PNR agreement's 15 year retention period could be affected by the judgement. If so, changing the agreement to accommodate the CJEU's ruling could be a form of the EU extending the reach of its changed laws. The decision is helpful to evaluate the legality of the PNR agreement, but as it is limited to a discussion on data retention, and the PNR is broader in scope than the Directive, it would not provide a definitive answer on the legality of the PNR agreement.
Any limit on the enjoyment of a right or freedom under the EU Charter must be provided for by law; respect the essence of the right or freedom concerned; and, particularly relevant to data retention, must be subject to the principle of proportionality: "limitations may be made to those rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others". confirms that EU-third State accords involving personal data will have to be re-evaluated according to the principles of proportionality and necessity evoked in the judgement. 48 Since the judgement, the Commission has consistently iterated that data retention laws are a national concern and that it will not enter that discussion. 49 The effects of the Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems cases should be evident in the outcome of the next joint review of the PNR agreement, which, as it was originally scheduled for early 2015, should happen in the foreseeable future. 43 Ibid., §65.
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Ibid., §71. The DPD states that personal data must not be kept in a form allowing for identification of data subjects for longer than necessary for the purposes for which the data was collected and processed. 50 This implies that data can lawfully be stored for an indefinite period if it is anonymized. Further, the 2002 ePrivacy Directive, as referenced by the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland, provides that Member States shall ensure storing data or accessing stored data "is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing".
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The ePrivacy Directive also states Member States may adopt legislation that restricts the rights and obligations in that Directive, which largely revolve around protecting personal data, "when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security". 52 The DRD provided that retaining data was necessary and effective for law enforcement to investigate organized crime and terrorism in certain Member States and therefore necessitated making data retained under that Directive available to law enforcement.
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Nonetheless, the CJEU decided this general interest objective, that is, to combat serious crime, organized crime and terrorism, did not per se justify the level of data retention the DRD required.
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It will be interesting to see how this conclusion could affect the PNR agreement, which has almost identical objectives.
The CJEU took issue with the blanket data retention the DRD required. Operators were obliged to store all clients' personal telecommunications data, not just the data of those who were likely to be involved in a serious crime. 55 The CJEU stated the Directive thus resulted in an "an [unlawful] interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population". 56 According to the PNR agreement, air carriers conducting passenger flights to and from the US and the EU are obliged to transfer 19 types of PNR data from each journey in their reservation systems, pertaining to suspicious and unsuspicious passengers alike, to the DHS. 57 This indiscriminate transfer requirement could conflict with the CJEU's pronouncements on blanket data retention.
The Court ruled that the DRD did not provide for distinction between data types according to potential usefulness; it also failed to outline a way to determine objectively how long personal data should be retained within the data retention period of 6 to 24 months. 58 This violated the principle of necessity insomuch as an indiscriminate volume of anyone's personal data could potentially be retained for a period of time exceeding the limits of what was necessary. 59 The 2011 PNR agreement contains provisions that would allow for data retention that clearly violate the principle of necessity as 50 DPD, supra n. 6, Art. 6(1)(e). 
52
Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 2, §10 cit. ePrivacy Directive, ibid. Art. 15(1), see also Recital 4 of the preamble.
53
DRD, supra n. 38, preamble, Recital 9.
54
Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 2, §51.
55
Ibid., §37.
56
Ibid., §56.
57
2011 PNR agreement, supra n. 1, Art. 3.
58
Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 2, § §63-64. 59 Ibid., § §63-64.
the CJEU applied it in the Digital Rights Ireland decision. After a period of 5 active years, data is transferred to a non-active or dormant database for up to 10 additional years. 60 The agreement states that after the dormant period, the data must be anonymized, but it makes no mention of deletion.
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Compare this to the 2007 agreement, in which DHS officials "expect[ed]" PNR data would be deleted after the 15 year retention period. 62 It appears the PNR data of US-EU passengers could be retained, perhaps unnecessarily, for up to 15 years and potentially indefinitely thereafter. There is only one restriction no which type of data may be retained for longer in the active database: data "related to a specific case or investigation may be retained in an active PNR database until the case or investigation is archived". 63 Further, PNR data in the dormant database can be repersonalized "in connection with law enforcement operations and then only in connection with an identifiable case, threat or risk"; dormant PNR data can be repersonalized for up to five years. 64 It is useful to recall the DPD provision that identifiable personal data must not be stored longer than necessary, but anonymized data could, by extension, be retained beyond this necessary period. The 2011 PNR agreement increases the data retention period when compared with the previous agreements, but provided this retention satisfies the proportionality and necessity principles, US storage of anonymized data could be lawful.
(3) Third Party Access to Data
The DPD provides that processing personal data is permitted only if, inter alia, it is necessary for "the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party" or "purposes of the legitimate interests" of a third party "except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject". 65 The Digital Rights Ireland judgement asserts that obliging telecommunications companies to retain data pertaining to someone's private life per seconstitutes an interference in the right to respect for private and family life as enshrined in the EU Charter. 66 The Court refers to DHS could share PNR data with other US counter-terrorism or law enforcement agencies. The 2007 agreement expanded this to public security authorities, thereby widening the scope of potential onward data transfers to third parties. 68 The CJEU maintained that the DRD did not provide for "any objective criterion [or substantive and procedural conditions] by which to determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions". 69 The 2011 PNR agreement is similarly silent on providing criteria and conditions for national authorities' access to the data: access is "restricted to a limited number of specifically authorized officials". 70 The dormant database is "subject to additional controls, including a more restricted number of authorized personnel, as well as a higher level of supervisory approval required before access". 71 The PNR agreement fails to delineate what constitutes a "limited number", a "more restrictive number" and "specifically authorized" officials or personnel and, moreover, who decides upon the definition and scope of these terms. A US Congress document highlighted how fewer authorized personnel would be able to access the data over time, in what could be considered a weak attempt to show the US is limiting third party access to data.
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The CJEU was concerned that no court or independent body, upon review, could allow or deny national authorities access to the data retained under the DRD. 73 81 Under the 2011 PNR agreement, sensitive data used for a specific investigation, prosecution or enforcement action may be retained for however long US law specifies. 82 If not used for one of these specific purposes, sensitive data must be deleted within 30 days of collection. 83 Whilst US authorities maintain that they regularly filter sensitive data out of their computer systems, they acknowledge such data might be useful if the authorities are alerted to "passengers who request wheelchairs hiding bombs in leg casts, or a warning about a threat to a political gathering, or a health emergency affecting people with communicable diseases such as tuberculosis". 84 The DPD does permit the processing for sensitive data for medical purposes, but this is completely unrelated to the aim of the PNR agreement, so it could possibly threaten the necessity principle.
(5) Data Transmission
In something of a rare victory, the EU was successful in changing the data transmission method to protect its data protection values, although only to a certain extent. The 2004 PNR agreement introduced the "pull" method of obtaining PNR data, whereby the US DHS would retrieve the relevant information from airlines. The 2007 PNR agreement, however, obliged airlines to supply US authorities with the relevant information. The former "pull" method was subject to strong criticism from the EU, so EU officials welcome the latter "push" method. 86 Unlike the 2007 agreement, however, which stipulates that the DHS will immediately adopt the "push" system, the 2011 agreement includes a clause stipulating "where necessary, on a case-by-case basis" the DHS may require access to data, which recalls the initial "pull" method, albeit on a far more restricted basis.
(6) Judicial Redress
Under the 2011 PNR accord, any data subject whose data has been processed in a way that violates the accord is entitled to effective administrative and judicial redress under US law. 88 During negotiations, EU officials took issue with redress opportunities for EU citizens whose data was processed in the US. The 2011 PNR agreement does not create any right or benefit under US law for any public or private person or entity. 89 As such, EU officials have questioned whether adequate and effective redress policies exist under US law. Furthermore, as the US Privacy Act does not apply to EU citizens, it is questionable whether other US statutes would provide a sufficiently high level of data protection to EU citizens' data. 90 That said, the 2007 agreement outlines a DHS policy choice to "to extend administrative Privacy Act protections to PNR data stored in the ATS", without prejudice to a data subject's nationality. 91 Whilst the 2011 agreement does not explicitly refer to the US Privacy Act, it mentions various related US Acts and "other applicable provisions of US law", thereby potentially including the US Privacy Act. 92 EU pro-privacy commentators have argued that "the practical enforcement of remedies in the US for EU citizens is difficult", thereby questioning how effective US redress opportunities would be in practice. 93 Nonetheless, and not unexpectedly, US officials asserted the May 2011 draft accord provided enhanced legal certainty for passengers seeking redress. 94 Meanwhile, the EU has continued to push for improved redress opportunities for its citizens, especially in reaction to the 2013 Snowden revelations. 95 
CONCLUSION
Whilst the PNR agreements reflect many original US demands, the EU's continual renegotiation efforts show it remains dissatisfied with the agreements' lack of data protection. Seeing as the CJEU annulled the DRD and invalidated the Safe Harbour agreement, and the European Parliament referred the Canada-EU PNR agreement to the CJEU to assess its adherence to EU treaties and the EU Charter, it is increasingly apparent that the 2011 US-EU PNR agreement does not uphold EU data protection principles. It appears the political will to address this shortcoming is growing in the EU. The foregoing shows how the agreement could be modified to better adhere to these principles and ultimately to better protect EU citizens. The PNR agreement negotiations have been a constant struggle between US-EU values and laws. If the EU could ensure its data protection principles are affirmed in any subsequent PNR data sharing arrangement, this would appear to be an extraterritorial diffusion of its law. This diffusion, however, is necessary to protect EU citizens' fundamental right to
